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LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
SECURITIES REGULATION: VARIABLE ANNUrIES AND COMMON TRUST FUNDS
FOR MANAGING AGENCY ACCOUNTS
The depression stock market crash spawned the entrance of the federal govern-
ment into the field of securities regulation. The Securities Acts of 1933' and 1934,2
along with the Investment Company Act of 1940,3 were the major legislative answers
to the problems then existing. Today, modern institutions adapting to the current
needs of investors have devised plans for commingling the funds of these investors
in ways not contemplated when the federal acts were adopted. Two types of such
institutions - insurance companies and banks - were seemingly granted broad
exemptions from these regulations. The purpose of this Note is to investigate the
recent controversies surrounding the application of these exemptions to individual4
variable annuity contracts issued by regular-line insurance companies and to bank
commingled or common trust funds for their managing agent accounts.
I. Federal Legislation
Securities Act of 1933. This acte is premised on the proposition that if the
federal government requires full disclosure of pertinent information by the proposed
issuer of a security, the prospective investor will be in a position to wisely compare
and choose his risk-medium. The act's main provisions are those relating to regis-
tration6 and the prospectus,7 supplemented by the broad rule-making s and en-
forcement9 authority vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It
provides stringent civil'0 and criminal" remedies for various types of fraud.
The act contains a broad definition of the term "security,"'12 including therein
the term "investment contract." In SEC v. W.I. Howey Co., s3 the Supreme Court
defined this latter term in the context of this act to mean, "[A] contract, transac-
tion or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and
1 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1958),as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 77b (Supp. IV, 1963). See generally I Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 130 (2d ed.
1961).
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1958), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c-s (Supp. IV, 1963). See generally I Loss, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 130-31.
3 Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2 to -39 (Supp. IV, 1963). See generally 1 Loss, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 144-53.
4 Group pension plans providing variable annuity benefits also present problems. As the
SEC is currently dealing with them in its administrative capacity, they are excluded from the
scope of this Note. See generally SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 3605, Jan. 7,
1963; Wall Street Journal, Apr. 14, 1964, p. 2, col. 3.
5 Supra note 1.
6 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 §§ 5-8, 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-h (1958).
7 Securities Act of 1933 § 10, 48 Stat. 81 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1958).
8 Securities Act of 1933 § 19, 48 Stat. 85 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1958).
9 Securities Act of 1933 § 20, 48 Stat. 86 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1958).
10 Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 48 Stat. 82 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1958).
11 Securities Act of 1933 § 24, 48 Stat. 87 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1958).
12 Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 48 Stat. 905 (1934), 15
U.S.C. § 77b-1 (1958):
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond debenture, evidence of indebted-
ness, certificate of interest or participation in an profit-sharing agreement,
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transfer-
able share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security,... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known
as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to sub-
scribe to purchase, any of the foregoing.
13 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or third party . .. "14
adding that it should be construed "so as to afford the investing public a full
measure of protection."' 5 But section 3(a) provides that the following are ex-
empted securities:
(2) [A]ny security issued or guaranteed by any national bank, or by any
banking institution organized under the laws of any State or Territory
or the District of Columbia, the business of which is substantially confined
to banking and is supervised by the State or Territorial banking com-
mission or similar official; . . .16 (8) Any insurance or endowment policy
or annuity contract or optional annuity contract, issued by a corporation
subject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner, bank commis-
sioner, or any agency or officer performing like functions, of any State
or Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia.1'
Investment Company Act of 1940. This acte s has been called "the most com-
plex of the entire SEC series."' 9 Motivation for Congressional action emanated
from the widespread abuses 20 prevalent in the "investment company" 21 industry
in the preceding years, as disclosed by an exhaustive series of SEC reports22 on
which the act was based. It divides investment companies into three broad classi-
fications: face-amount certificate companies, unit investment trusts, and manage-
ment companies.2 3 Its extensive provisions, in addition to vesting broad rule-making
authority in the Commissioner, 24 contain requirements as to registration,2 5 detailed
semi-annual reports which must be made to the SEC and the stockholders,
2 com-
position 27 and election 28 of the board of directors, major changes in investment
14 Id. at 298-99.
15 Id. at 298. The Court also pointed out that "form [should be] ... disregarded for sub-
stance and emphasis ... placed upon economic reality." Id. at 298.
16 Securities Act of 1938 § 3(a) (2), 48 Stat. 76 (1933), as amended, 48 Stat. 906 (1934),
15 U.S.C. § 77c-(a) (2) (1958).
17 Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a) (8), 48 Stat. 76 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77c-(a) (8) (1958).
A rare reference to this provision in the legislative history states:
The above exemption makes clear what is already implied in the Act,
namely, that insurance policies are not to be regarded as securities subject to
the provisions of the Act. The insurance policy and like contracts are not
regarded in the commercial world as securities offered to the public for in-
vestment purposes.
H.R. R P. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1933). (Emphasis added.)
18 Supra note 3.
19 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 1, at 152.
20 See the "Findings and declaration of policy," Investment Company Act of 1940 § 1, 54
Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1958).
21 This term is defined in § 3(a) to include any issuer which -
(1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to
engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in
securities;
(2) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-
amount certificates of the installment type... ; or
(3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing.., in
securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a
value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such issuer's total assets (ex-
clusive of Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis.
Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 797 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1958).
22 See 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 1, at 147 n.52.
23 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 4, 54 Stat. 799 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4 (1958).
24 See, e.g., Investment Company Act of 1940 §§ 8, 38, 54 Stat. 803, 841 (1940), 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-8, 37 (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(e) (Supp. IV, 1963).
25 The main provision is § 8, 54 Stat. 803 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1958), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(e) (Supp. IV, 1963).
26 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 30, 54 Stat. 836 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29
(1958).
27 Investment Company Act of 1940 §§ 9-10, 54 Stat. 805 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-9, 10
(1958).
28 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 16(a), 54 Stat. 813 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(a)
(1958), designed to give the investors a voice in the management, provides in part that:
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policies,2 insider-dealings,30 capital structure,31 advertising, 2 maximum "sales load"
charges for periodic payment plans, 33 and other management practices. 4
This Act defines the terms "company,"35 "bank"
' s and "insurance company,"3 7
and then exempts from the definition of "investment company"38s the following:
Any bank or insurance company; ... any common trust fund or similar fund
maintained by a bank exclusively for the collective investment and reinvest-
ment of moneys contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity as a trustee,
executor, administrator, or guardian; .... 89
Despite these express exemptions, the SEC contends that a regular-line in-
surance company issuing individual variable annuity contracts, and a bank pro-
posing to commingle its managing agency accounts in a common trust fund, must
comply with these federal laws.
40
II. Controversy Over Variable Annuities
Background. The variable annuity is an answer proposed by some insurance
No person shall serve as a director of a registered investment company
unless elected to that office by the holders of the outstanding voting securities
of such company, at an annual or special meeting duly called for that
purpose....
29 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 13, 54 Stat. 811 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13
(1958), requires such changes to be "authorized by the vote of a majority of its outstanding
voting securities...."
30 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 17, 54 Stat. 815 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17
(1958).
31 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 18, 54 Stat. 817 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18
(1958).
32 See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 24(b)-(c), 54 Stat. 826 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §
80a-24(b), (c) (1958).
33 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 27, 54 Stat. 829 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27
(1958).
34 See, e.g., Investment Company Act of 1940 § 12, 54 Stat. 808 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §
80a-12 (1958), regulating and prohibiting various practices.
35 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a) (8), 54 Stat. 791 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(8) (1958):
"Company" means a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-
stock company, a trust, a fund, or any organized group of persons whether
incorporated or not.... (Emphasis added.)
36 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a) (5), 54 Stat. 791 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(5) (1958):
"Bank" means (A) a banking institution organized under the laws of
the United States, (B) a member bank of the Federal Reserve System, (C)
any other banking institution or trust company, whether incorporated or not,
doing business under the laws of any State or of the United States, a sub-
stantial portion of the business of which consists of receiving deposits or exer-
cising fiduciary powers similar to those permitted to national banks under
section 248 (k) of Title 12, and which is supervised and examined by
State or Federal authority having supervision over banks, and which is not
operated for the purpose of evading the provisions of this subchapter...
(Subsection (D) omitted.)
37 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a) (17), 54 Stat. 793 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(17) (1958):
"Insurance company" means a company which is organized as an insur-
ance company, whose primary and predominant business activity is the
writing of insurance... and which is subject to supervision by the insurance
commissioner or a similar official or agency of a State. . . . (Emphasis
added.)
38 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3(a), note 21 supra.
39 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3(c) (3), 54 Stat. 798 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
3(c)(3) (1958).
40 The words of Mr. Justice Holmes should be recalled when construing technical statutory
verbiage:
A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a
living thought and may vary greatly in color and context according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used.
Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
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companies to the problem posed by rising costs on the one hand and, on the other,
the generally fixed retirement income of most people.41 A variable annuity is a
contract which does not provide the traditional fixed-dollar annuity payments.
Instead, income varies with the fluctuation in the current value of the securities
portfolio into which the funds paid for the contract have been invested. Although
individual variable annuity contracts may differ in insignificant features depending
on the issuer's plan, their general nature may be summarized as follows:
The distinguishing feature of the variable annuity is that the annuitant's
payments purchase units in a fund of securities, much as in the case of an
open-end investment company. The accumulation in the annuitant's account
is valued at maturity, and the insurance company promises to pay him
thereafter not a fixed number of dollars monthly but the dollar value, fluctu-
ating with each monthly payment as the value of the portfolio fluctuates, of
the annuity units to which it is determined at maturity that the annuitant
is entitled on the basis of capital contribution, age and sex. That is to say,
the first payment after maturity is determined by reference to standard an-
nuity tables, on the basis of an assumed net investment rate of a certain per-
centage per annum, but the figure thus obtained is converted into annuity
units by dividing it by the then value of an annuity unit. Thereafter the
number of annuity units held by the annuitant remains constant, but the
dollar value of a unit and hence the amount of subsequent monthly pay-
ments fluctuate as the value of the portfolio goes up or down.
42
In 1959, the Supreme Court, in SEC v. Variable Annuity Co.43 (VALIC),
decided that an individual variable annuity was a "security" within the meaning
of the federal act because it "places all the investment risks on the annuitant, none
on the company."44 The Court admitted that there was a mortality risk45 assumed
by VALIC, but said as to this risk: "[I]t is apparent, not real; superficial, not sub-
stantial. In hard reality the issuer of a variable annuity that has no element of a
fixed return assumes no true risk in the insurance sense."
46
Since Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court generically classified the variable
annuity as a "security," there was no compelling reason to compare traditional
state insurance laws with the federal securities regulations to determine which was
more appropriate for these contracts. But he did observe that state laws regulating
"annuities" as "insurance" pertained in the main to fixed annuities.47 The point
is that in the case of fixed annuities the insurance company guarantees a fixed
monthly payment, i.e., the investment risk is on the company. Therefore state in-
surance regulations are based on this premise - all they have to accomplish, with
a paternalistic regard for the annuitant or insured, is that the contract is fair
and that the company remains solvent to meet these obligations as they mature.
These regulations thus deal mainly with capital and investment controls, statutory
policy provisions, and licensing of companies and agents.48 Such protective de-
41 For some of the earlier articles presenting the controversy over the nature and desirabil-
ity of the variable annuity, see, e.g., Johnson, The Variable Annuity: What It Is and Why It Is
Needed, 1956 INs. L.J. 357; Day, A Variable Annuity Is Not a "Security," 32 Nomam DAME
LAWYER 642 (1957); Hausserman, The Security in Variable Annuities, 1956 INs. L.J. 382;
Long, The Variable Annuity: A Common Stock Investment Scheme, 1956 INs. L.J. 393.
42 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 1, at 498. See also Note, 1959 WAsHr. U.L.Q. 206, 209-10.
43 359 U.S. 65 (1959). The Court was split 5-4, and two of the majority joined in a con-
curring opinion.
44 Id. at 71.
45 I.e., the risk that a substantial number of the annuitants would live beyond their
actuarially predicted life spans, coupled with VALIC's contract obligation to make the annuity
payments on the basis of their mortality predictions.
46 359 U.S. at 71. For hypothetical situations comparing a standard annuity, mutual fund
shares, and a variable annuity in periods of economic inflation and depression, concluding that
the mortality risk assumed by the company is very real, see Mearns, The Commission, the Vari-
able Annuity, and the Inconsiderate Sovereign, 45 VA. L. Rav. 831, 834-40 (1959). That even
the mortality risk is not assumed by the issuer, but rather by the "policyholders as a group," see
106 U. PA. L. REV. 483, 487 (1957).
47 359 U.S. at 69.
48 See generally Note, Federal and State Regulation of the Variable Annuity, 44 MiNN. L.
REV. 289 (1960).
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vices are inherently inadequate where a "security" is involved; the insurance com-
pany does not guarantee a fixed payment, and the investment risk is on the variable
annuitant, not the company. Only the full disclosure and "corporate democracy"
regulatory concepts embodied in the federal securities laws can adequately pro-
tect the investor's interest, prevent the abuses common to such investment funds,
and at the same time leave the investment decision to an informed investor.
Properly intermeshed with this investor protection standard is that of uniformity of
regulation under SEC jurisdiction. Justice Douglas remarked:
It is apparent that there is no uniformity in the rulings of the States on
the nature of these [variable] "annuity" contracts. In any event how the
States may have ruled is not decisive. For... the meaning of "insurance"
or "annuity" under these Federal Acts is a federal question.
49
VALIC, the proposed ostensible issuer in this case, was regulated under the
laws of the District of Columbia as an insurance company, but it was to sell only
these variable annuities. This, at least implicitly, prevented the 1940 act's "in-
surance company" exemption"0 from coming into operation, for such company's
"primary and predominant business activity"51 must be the writing of insurance.
With this reasoning, the Court held that the issuer of such contracts was subject
to both the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act.
Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, stated that the test was "whether
the contract falls within the sort of investment form that Congress was then [i.e.,
in 1933 and 1940] willing to"52 exempt from the federal regulations. He recognized
that the variable annuity is a hybrid creation, but after comparing investor pro-
tection under the federal laws and under the "paternalistic" state insurance laws,
he concluded that the variable annuity was different in kind from the insurance
business exempted from these federal regulations.5 3 In his finding that this contract
presented regulatory problems similar to those Congress was attemptingto solve by
these acts, a broad standard was espoused:
These [federal] controls may be largely irrelevant to traditional banks and
insurance companies, which Congress clearly exempted; they were not in-
vesting heavily in equity securities and holding out the possibilities of capital
gains through fund management; but where the investor is asked to put his
money in a scheme for managing it on an equity basis, it is evident that the
Federal Act's controls become vital.
5 4
The dissenting opinion in VALIC, representing the views of four Justices,
would leave variable annuity regulation to the states. While this would not foster
uniform regulation, it was pointed out that if any inadequacies exist in state law
protection of the variable annuitants' interests, we can expect the states to "ad-
just and develop their controls." 55 At least one state, New Jersey, has attempted to
do just this.56
The VALIC decision, on its three-year judicial journey to the Supreme Court,
evoked much discussion, often critical; 57 most commentators seemed to agree with
the result finally reached.58
49 359 U.S. at 69.
50 See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
51 See statute cited note 37 supra.
52 359 U.S. 65, 76 (concurring opinion).
53 Id. at 91.
54 Id. at 79-80.
55 359 U.S. 65, 101 (dissenting opinion).
56 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:35A-1 to -13, §§ 17:34-19, 24 (1963). For a list of states which
have adopted legislation specifically authorizing variable annuities or segregated accounts for
such annuities or both, see I Loss, SECURITIES REoULATION (Supp. 1962, at 30 n.120).
57 The district court denied the SEC's prayer for an injunction, SEC v. Variable Annuity
L. Ins. Co., 155 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C. 1957). Several comments suggested the wrong result
had been reached, e.g., 71 HARvAmw L. REv. 562 (1958); 46 GEo. L.J. 542 (1958); 106 U.
PA. L. REv. 483 (1957). The court of appeals affirmed, SEC v. Variable Annuity L. Ins. Co.,
257 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1958), 42 MINN. L. REV. 1115 (1958).
58 The best critical comment on the Supreme Court opinion is MEARNS, sUpra note 46.
Worth comparing are the thoughts of interested parties: by the former president of VALIC,
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Present Controversy. Granting that the individual variable annuity is a "se-
curity," the VALIC decision did not reach the question of whether a regular-line
insurance company issuing such contracts could take advantage of the Investment
Company Act's section 3 (c) (3) exemption. Such a company would, unlike VALIC,
have as its "primary and predominant business activity . . . the writing of in-
surance." 59 This question has been recently answered. Prudential Insurance Com-
pany of America60 requested an order from the SEC declaring that its offer and sale
of variable annuity contracts would not subject it, in whole or in part, to the In-
vestment Company Act. The SEC order"1 recognized Prudential's exemption, but
held that the unincorporated Investment Fund,62 created out of the proceeds of
the sale of the proposed contracts, is the issuer, and an investment company under
the terms of the act.
3
The SEC's order was affirmed in Prudential Ins. Co. v. SEC."" The court's
opinion adopted the Commission's summary of the salient characteristics of Pru-
dential's variable annuities.6 5 They are similar to those in VALIC, 66 and those
described previously in this note, including: monthly purchase payments during
the "pay-in" period, the net proceeds of which go into the "Investment Fund,"
which is invested primarily in common stocks; monthly "unit" credits to the pur-
chaser, the value of which fluctuates with the investment results of the fund; and
after the normal (at least 15-year) "pay-in" period, guaranteed monthly pay-
ments during the annuity or "pay-out" period, based on the current value of a
fixed number of units (based in turn on the purchaser's accumulated units, an
assumed annual investment increment, and actuarial computations) determined at
the end of the pay-in period.
The Prudential court limited itself to the narrow question of "[W]hether the
Commission made a permissible interpretation in concluding that the variable
annuity program results in the creation of a separate, non-exempt investment
company,"67 i.e., the Investment Fund. The term "company" is defined in the In-
vestment Company Act to include "a trust, a fund, or any organized group of per-
Johnson, The Variable Annuity - Insurance, Investment, or Both?, 48 GEo. L.J. 641 (1960);
by counsel for securities dealers in VALIC, Dorsey, The Place of "Variable Annuities" in Law
and Economics, 34 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 489 (1959). See also, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 248
(1960); 12 VAND. L. Rxv. 1398 (1959); 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 206.
59 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a) (17), cited note 37 supra, defines the "insur-
ance company" in the § 3(c) (3) exemption, cited note 39 supra.
60 Prudential is a mutual life insurance company organized under the laws of New Jersey
and subject to regulation by the N.J. Dept. of Banking and Insurance. At the end of 1962, with
approximately 36 million policy holders, its total assets were approximately $18.6 billion, and
it had in force contracts of insurance amounting to over $82.1 billion. Brief for Petitioner, Pru-
dential Ins. Co. v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1964). The comparable figures at the end of
1963 were approximately 37 million, $19.8 billion, and $96.6 billion, respectively. Wall Street
Journal, Feb. 25, 1964, p. 7, col. 2.
61 Prudential Ins. Co. of America, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 3620, Jan.
22, 1963, 61 MIcH. L. Rav. 1374 (1963). See Note, Securities Regulation: SEC Reiterates
Decision That Issuers of Variable Annuity Contracts are Subject to Federal Regulation Under
Investment Company Act of 1940, 1963 DuxE L.J. 807.
62 This is the Fund in which the purchaser holds units. It is managed by Prudential, and
invested primarily in common stocks. This account is dedicated solely to the variable annuity
contract holders and its assets will not be subject to claims of any other contract or policyholders
of Prudential.
63 In a VALIC release, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 2974, Feb. 25, 1960,
the SEC had already expressed the theory that the holders of the variable annuity contracts (in
VALIC), along with the proceeds of their payments, constituted an "investment company"
separate from the issuer and subject to the act. But since VALIC itself did not qualify for a §
3(c) (3) exemption, and hence had to register, separate registration of the fund was not
required.
64 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
65 Id. at 384-85.
66 359 U.S. 65, 81-87 (1959) (described in Brennan's concurring opinion).
67 326 F.2d at 386.
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sons whether incorporated or not.' 68 The court, in rejecting Prudential's argument
that the act regulates only identifiable business entities with some sort of internal
organization, relied primarily on one small portion of the exhaustive SEC reports
on which the act was premised, wherein reference was made to the following type
of management investment company:
[A)n agency relationship between the individual contributors to the fund
and the management upon whom they confer substantially a power of attor-
ney to act as agent in the investment of the moneys contributed. The group
of individual investors is not a legal entity but rather constitutes in essence
a combination of distinct individual interests. 69
The contention was also advanced that Prudential was the "issuer" because
it, not any amorphous entity, assumed the mortality risk. This was rejected be-
cause the annuitant's interest is solely in the Fund. The fact that this mortality
risk is more fiction than true risk appeared when:
Mhe actuary for Prudential testified that the deductions provided for in
the contract would be more than adequate to satisfy the annuity obligations.
Hence, the annuitant's interest in the general assets of Prudential is, at best,
de minimis.70
To defeat the relationship theory, Prudential also argued that adequate state
regulation was the basis for the insurance company exemption. 71 But the court
also rejected this, stating that VALIC "holds unequivocally that adequate state
regulation of insurance is immaterial when variable annuity contracts are being
considered under a Federal statute." 72 This generalization may be too broad, ap-
plied to the facts of the Prudential case. While at the time VALIC was decided
there were no state regulations which were deemed adequate, Prudential proposes
to operate under the subsequently adopted New Jersey laws73 specifically designed
for regulation of variable annuity situations.
Conclusion. Whether the VALIC Court would have considered these new
state regulations "adequate" is now academic. It is conceivable that such a finding
by Justice Brennan, i.e., that the issuer was regulated under state laws similar to
the federal provisions for disclosure and investment control, would have changed
the result in VALIC.
But even assuming that the New Jersey variable annuity laws would meet
the "adequacy" standard, it is submitted that the Prudential court reached the right
result. This is the only course which affords uniform, nondiscriminatory treat-
ment to all proposed issuers. It is the only way each investor can be afforded the
same protection. Not that uniformity is an end in itself; indeed, it is not embodied
in traditional state regulation of insurance. Rather, uniformity here would be a
means of guaranteeing the very essence of investment protection sought by Congress
in the securities laws. If regulation of the variable annuity were left to each of the
fifty states, the potential investor in what is basically a "security" could not make
the intelligent, informed choice contemplated by Congress. In addition to com-
paring the prospectuses and reports furnished him by issuers situated in different
states, he would need to research the individual states' laws to compare the con-
tent and form of required disclosure; he would also have to investigate the states'
investment and management control regulations. These should all weigh in his
ultimate choice, as well as his later decision on whether to stay in the fund. Ob-
viously the typical investor in such contracts would find this impossible.
It would also be impractical to expect the Supreme Court to determine the
adequacy of each state's new laws on a case-by-case basis; however, even if adopted,
this would not eliminate the discrepancies which may be expected in the judicially-
approved laws. Add to this the varying degrees of administration and enforce-
68 See statute cited note 35 supra.
69 H.R. Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 24 (1939).
70 326 F.2d at 387 n.5.
71 Brief for Petitioner, pp. 27-31, Prudential Ins. Co. v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1964).
72 326 F.2d at 388.
73 See statutes cited note 56 supra.
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ment which may be expected in the separate states, and the very problem Congress
sought to eliminate reappears. A uniform state act for regulation of variable an-
nuity contracts would be helpful, but hardly to be expected. Nor is it needed, for we
already have such legislation under experienced administration in SEC regulation.
One of the principal drafters of the Securities Act of 1933 recently noted
that the "annuities of duly regulated insurance companies" exemption was never
intended for variable annuities.7 4 He favored SEC regulation, but added that:
considering and contrasting the essence of variable annuities and bank
commingled managing agency accounts, and looking to their practical rami-
fications, can a different conclusion be advocated? [I]f the sale of variable
annuities had been a flourishing business of insurance companies in 1933,
they would in all probability have been specifically exempted. Such is the
political power of life insurance.
75
On the subject of bank commingled managing agency accounts, similar questions
of intent, ifs and probabilities come into play.
III. Commingling Bank Managing Agent Accounts In a Common Trust Fund
Background.7 6 In general, common trust funds are funds maintained by banks
or trust institutions for the collective investment and reinvestment of moneys from
the personal trusts or estates of which the institution is fiduciary.7 7 Their utiliza-
tion by banks subject to the Federal Reserve System was not sanctioned until 1937.78
Before 1927, when the first common trust fund was established, trust law required
that, without express authority to commingle in the trust instrument, the bank-
trustee keep the funds of each trust segregated and "earmarked. 17 9 This presented
problems as to small trust accounts, not the least of which were high service costs
and lack of adequate disversification. As the states began to pass enabling legisla-
tion for common trust funds,80 the Treasury Department's position that the business
transacted by such funds was taxable as a corporation (in addition to the taxes
payable by the beneficiaries) was upheld in the courts.81 The need for federal tax
exemption to avoid this double taxation being apparent, Congress in 1936 defined a
common trust fund for tax ("association") exemption purposes as:
[A] fund maintained by a bank (1) exclusively for the collective invest-
ment and reinvestment of moneys contributed thereto by the bank in its
capacity as a trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian; and (2) in con-
formity with the rules and regulations ... [formerly of the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, now including those of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency].
8 2
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) then amended
Regulation F, providing in part:
(a) In general.-Funds received or held by a national bank as fiduciary
may be invested collectively in any Common Trust Fund established and
maintained in accordance with the provisions of this section whenever the
laws of the State in which the national bank is located authorize or permit
such investments by State banks....
74 Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. Rv.
29, 46 n.24 (1960).
75 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
76 See generally H.R. REP. No. 429, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
77 BOGERT, LAW or TRusrs § 105, at 278 (4th ed. 1963):
The bank or trust company purchases with the mingled funds of its
trusts a large number of investments which are legal for all the participating
trusts... and allots interests in the fund to the contributing trusts in propor-
tion to the size of their payments.
78 H.R. Doc. No. 476, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1939).
79 Ibid. See generally BOGERT, LAw Or TRuSTS § 100 (4th ed. 1963); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), TRuSTS §§ 179-80 (1959).
80 See BOGERT, TRuSTS & TRUSTEES §§ 616-64 (general standards-state statutes), § 677
(includes copy of UNIFORM CoMMoN TRuST FUND Ac ) (2d ed. 1960).
81 Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 659
(1936).
82 Int. Rev. Code of 1936, ch. 690, § 169(a), 49 Stat. 1708 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 584(a), as amended, 76 Stat. 669-70 (1962)).
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As used in this regulation the term "Common Trust Fund" means a
fund maintained by a national bank exclusively for the collective investment
of moneys contributed thereto .by the bank in its capacity as trustee, executor,
administrator or guardian.
The purpose of this section is to permit the use of Common Trust
Funds, as defined in section 169 of the Revenue Act of 1936, for the invest-
ment of funds held for true fiduciary purposes; and the operation of such
. . . funds as investment trusts for other than strictly fiduciary purposes is
hereby prohibited .... 83
While this regulation only applied to banks under the Board's jurisdiction, the tie-
in with the tax exemption made it imperative for any other bank which wished to
operate such common trust funds to comply also.
From 1936 until 1962, while such funds were under Board regulation, the bona
fide fiduciary-purpose standard was strictly applied, with few exceptions. A
Board amendment in 1955 permitted collective investment of various employee
benefit funds.8 4 The Board also permitted national banks to operate "managing
agency accounts" under which advisory and management investment services were
performed for individual customers; however, collective investment or commingling
of such accounts was prohibited. The Board's concept was that common trust funds
should be mere aids in trust administration; they were not to be operated as in-
vestment trusts to attract those primarily seeking investment management of their
funds."'
Since the SEC considered such funds exempt from the 1940 Act under the
specific exemption in section 3(c) (3), s and from the Securities Act of 1933 be-
cause there was no "public offering,"8' 7 the legislative history is important as it
reveals the nature of common trust funds in the late 1930s. One of the SEC re-
ports underlying the Investment Company Act provides that a survey was made
"of the commingled or common trust funds, since these constitute an investment
vehicle akin to the investment company of the general management type."8 8 Other
pertinent observations include:
The common trust fund, like the investment company, has for its pur-
pose the procurement of an adequate diversified investment medium for the
small investor. The fund, in substance, combines a number of small personal
trusts or estates of which a bank.., is the trustee into one larger fund for
common administration and managements by the bank . . . in its trustee
capacity.8 9
Common trust funds have not participated in any active program of
advertising and solicitation for participants in their funds. In instances
where there was any solicitation for business it was of an informal nature
where the officers of the ... companies discussed with their clients the com-
parative advantages and disadvantages of particular investment media.9 0
Participation in a common trust fund is restricted to trust estates of
which the trustee is the bank. . . which sponsors common trust funds. Fur-
thermore, an individual trust estate may be commingled . . . only if the
instruments creating the individual trusts authorize not only the commingling
of such trust estate with other trust estates in a single unit, but also permit
investment in the type of assets in which the common trust fund is ultimately
to be invested.91
83 2 Fed. Reg. 2976 (1937).
84 Regulation F amendment, 20 Fed. Reg. 3305 (1955) (adding new § 17, "Common
Trust Funds").
85 See, e.g., 25 Fed. Reg. 12479 (1960); Operation of Common Trust Funds as Invest-
ment Trusts for Other Than Strictly Fiduciary Purposes, 26 FED. RESERVE BULL. 393 (1940);
41 FED. RESERVE BULL. 142 (1955); 42 FED. RESERvE BULL. 228 (1956).
86 See statute accompanying note 39 supra.
87 Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1), 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 48 Stat. 906 (1934), 15
U.S.C. § 77d-1 (1958), includes as an exempted transaction: "transactions by an issuer not in-
volving any public offering."
88 H.R. Doc. No. 476, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1939).
89 Id. at 3.
90 Id. at 6.
91 Id. at 7.
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This is, generally speaking, what the "common trust fund" looked liked when it
was exempted from the 1940 Act.
If any distinction is to be made between investment companies and bank com-
mon trust funds in the pre-Investment Company Act era, besides the Board regu-
lation of the latter, it must be the active and broad merchandising of the former
compared to the personal fiduciary element of the common trust fund. At any
rate, the number of common trust funds rose from the 16 in existence in 1935 to
511 such funds in 327 trust institutions with total assets exceeding $3.5 billion at
the end of 1961.92
Present Controversy. In September, 1962, authority over the trust powers of
national banks was transferred from the Board to the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency.93 The only change made at this time was in the name: from Regulation F
to Regulation 9.94 But in April, 1963, the Comptroller promulgated an amended
Regulation 9,95 which now permits, in addition to the collective funds previously
permitted under Regulation F, and where not in contravention of local law, the
collective investment of funds held by a national bank as fiduciary:
(3) In a common trust fund, maintained by the bank exclusively
for the collective investment and reinvestment of monies contributed
thereto by the bank in its capacity as managing agent under a managing
agency agreement expressly providing that such monies are received by
the bank in trust; .... 96
This regulation defines "managing agent" as:
[The fiduciary relitionship assumed by a bank upon the creation of
an account so entitled [which) confers investment discretion on the bank
and which imposes upon it the fiduciary responsibilities imposed upon
[executors, administrators, guardians or] trustees under will or deed;
[but as to which the technical legal relationship is that of agent and
principal; .... ]97
The SEC immediately took the position 's that the commingling of such ac-
counts would be indistinguishable from a mutual fund; therefore, the common trust
fund, as distinguished from the bank, would be in substance a mutual fund in-
vestment company and the issuer of a security, subject to both the 1933 and the
1940 Acts." In view of the "bank" and "common trust fund" exemptions,100 the
Comptroller strenuously argued 10 ' that this "ectoplasmic investment company"
theory, 0 2 though it may apply in cases like VALIC and Prudential, is logically
92 48 FEnD. RESERVE BULL. 528 (1962).
93 76 Stat. 668 (1962), 12 U.S.C. § 92a (Supp. IV, 1963).
94 27 Fed. Reg. 9764 (1962).
95 Fiduciary Powers of National Banks and Collective Investment Funds, 12 C.F.R. §§9.1-
.19 (Supp. 1964).
96 22 Fed. Reg. 1719 (1964), amending 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(a)(3) (Supp. 1964); the
amended portion, in italics, was added after the controversy arose.
97 22 Fed. Reg. 1719 (1964), amending 12 C.F.R. § 9.1(g) (Supp. 1964); the
amendment changed this section by adding the portion in italics and deleting the words
which are in brackets, not however making any significant changes in the regulation as it
had appeared before, other than the trustee-fiduciary requirement clarification.
98 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4589, March 11, 1963.
99 See generally 109 CONG. REc. 23997-99 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1963) (letter of SEC Com-
missioner Cary to Senator Robertson).
100 See statutes in text accompanying notes 16 and 39 supra.
101 Wall Street Journal, Mar. 13, 1963, p. 5, col. 3 (urging banks to challenge the asserted
SEC jurisdistion). See generally 110 CONG. REc. 791-92 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1964) (letter of
Comptroller Saxon to Senator Robertson). See also Hearing on Common Trust Funds (Over-
lapping Responsibility and Conflict in Regulation) Before a Subcommittee of the House Com-
mittee on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (hereinafter cited as 1963
Hearings).
102 This was explained by the Comptroller to be a "novel legal concept" working to "at-
tribute legal existence, as an entity, to one specific activity of a business otherwise exempt by
describing as an investment company any amorphous group which is deemed to be functioning
as an investment company." 1963 Hearings, supra note 101, at 35.
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unpalatable, a distortion of congressional purpose, and totally unworkable in ap-
plication as applied to these managing agent common trust funds.
03
Fear of dual regulation appears to have prevented any bank from setting
up such funds as of April, 1964.104 Nor is it known that any test case is pending.
A few of the basic tenets of disagreement can be mentioned, starting with
the Securities Act of 1933. One is whether there is a "security" involved in the
commingled managing agent trust fund, within the letter and spirit of the 1933
Act. The fact that the participation interests will be mere book entries, not evidenced
by any assignable or transferable document or certificate, is advanced by the Comp-
troller to support a negative answer. But the broad language of the Act, along
with the definition of "security" in the Howey case, 105 support the SEC position
that no written document as evidence of the interests is necessary.
The crux of the matter is whether the section 3(a) (2) exemption for "any
security issued or guaranteed by any national bank"'u 0 will defeat SEC jurisdiction.
The Comptroller says that this specific exemption would apply, and that a "bank"
would be the issuer. The SEC interpretation is that this exemption applies only
to securities directly issued or guaranteed by a bank.107 Thus, if we accept the
relationship theory as applied to the Prudential variable annuity, it is the com-
mon trust fund, not the bank, which is the issuer. In reality, the investor's unit
of interest is in the fund; there is no interest in, nor guarantee by, the bank entity.
The SEC must also meet the section 4(1) exemption for "transactions by
an issuer not involving any public offering."' 08 The Comptroller points to the in-
vestment-discretion of the bank, and the advertising and solicitation restrictions of
Regulation 9,109 to show there would be no "public offering" involved. The SEC
can counter with the realistic argument that the object of pooling many such
accounts so as to compete with mutual funds necessarily implies solicitation of cus-
tomers. The merits of either position should depend on the amount of active mer-
chandising a bank may do under Regulation 9's permissive standard: "[S]uch ma-
terial may be given publicity solely in connection with the promotion of the fidu-
ciary character of the bank.""n 0 The Supreme Court, in SEC v. Ralston Purina
Co.,"' stated that "[T]he applicability of § 4(1) should turn on whether the par-
ticular class of persons affected needs the protection of the Act."" 2 If the common
trust device for managing agent accounts is actively promoted to attract the smaller
103 Ibid. The SEC also claims that bank-trusteed commingled funds under the Self-Em-
ployed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-792, 76 Stat. 809 (1962)
(codified mainly in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., Supp. IV, 1963), will necessarily require a
public offering and therefore registration under the Securities Act of 1933; however, they will
be exempt from the Investment Company Act under the employees' pension trust exemption of
§ 3(c)(13), 54 Stat. 799 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(13) (1958). 1963 Hearings, supra
note 101, at 4-7; Letter from Mr. George P. Michaely, Jr., Special Counsel, SEC, to the Notre
Dame Lawyer, March 12, 1964, on file in Notre Dame Lawyer office. The Comptroller like-
wise disputes SEC jurisdiction in this area.
104 Letter from Donald L. Benson, Director, Information Dept., National Assoc. of Securities
Dealers, Inc., to the Notre Dame Lawyer, March 19, 1964, on file in the Notre Dame
Lawyer office, states:
[N]o banks, to my knowledge, have as yet established activities along
these lines. One bank in New York indicated they wished to proceed to com-
mingle common trust funds but were waiting to receive a tax opinion from
the Internal Revenue Service.
This tax ruling has been issued, favorable to the banks; see text accompanying note 118 infra.
105 See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.
106 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
107 1963 Hearings, supra note 101, at 4.
108 See statute cited note 87 supra.
109 The administration regulations would be under 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b) (Supp. 1964).
110 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b) (5) (iv) (Supp. 1964).
111 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
112 Id. at 125.
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investor,"' there is little doubt that this type of person should receive the same
protection, at least qualitatively, as when he invests in a nonbank sponsored mutual
fund. But if another regulatory scheme, i.e., the rules and regulations of the Comp-
troller, provides sufficient protection, the "need" for SEC regulation under this
act is illusory.
As previously stated, the Investment Company Act of 1940 exempts both
banks and, "[A]ny common trust fund or similar fund maintained by a bank ex-
clusively for the collective investment and reinvestment of moneys contributed
thereto by the bank in its capacity as a trustee, executor, administrator, or guard-
ian.""1 4 The managing agent common trust fund must be regarded as the in-
vestment company to uphold the SEC's position. Even than, the SEC must dis-
tinguish in substance this fund from the exempted one, i.e., on the ground that
the bank is not contributing thereto in its capacity as "trustee." The only basis
on which this can be done is to deny tliat the "trustee" concept in the statute
includes the fiduciary responsibility of a managing agent because of the latter's
discretion to determine whether or not the account funds will be invested in a
common trust fund. Assuming that Regulation 9 will not permit the use of such
collective funds for purely speculative purposes, as the Comptroller claims," 5
there is little reason to exclude this capacity from the trustee-cestui que trust rela-
tionship. It is submitted that the SEC report already discussed 18 supports this
interpretation. Considering the fact that the investor may withdraw and receive
his pro rata share at the valuation date, which must be at least one every three
months,1 7 there is little substantial difference between it and a revocable trust.
It cannot be disputed that one of the SEC reports underlying the 1940 Act's "com-
mon trust fund" exemption recognized that a bank is acting as a trustee even
with "revocable inter vivos trust estates which have been created specifically for
the purpose of participating in a commingled or common trust fund. 11 8
Conclusion. It is submitted that these commingled managing agent accounts
are a reasonable and minor extension of the Regulation F common trust funds,
and that they too should be exempted from SEC regulation under both acts. There
is no substantial difference between the managing agent funds and the trustee
funds previously considered exempt - the fiduciary responsibility regulated by
the Comptroller remains intact.
This interpretation appears to receive recognition in a 1964 Internal Reve-
nue Service ruling,119 which announced that the proposed managing agent com-
mon trust funds will qualify as a "common trust fund" within the meaning of
section 584 of the Tax Code, 20 provided they are operated in conformity with
the Comptroller's rules and regulations. At least for tax purposes the bank is held
to be contributing to the fund as a "trustee."
Assuming the SEC's strongest position as developed in the VALIC and Pru-
dential cases, that the managing agent common trust fund is the issuer, these
113 See, e.g., Judd, Common Trust Funds Under Regulation 9, 102 TRUSTS & ESTATES
569 (1963).
114 Statute cited note 39 supra.
115 110 CONG. Rec. 791-92 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1964):
The provisions of regulation 9 have been misunderstood by the Com-
missioner and by the investment company industry. That the regulation
permits this slight relaxation of common trust fund regulations does not
mean that it would permit anything which might be characterized as "wide-
spread merchandising ... " (W) e will [not] . . . fail to administer our
duties responsibly.
See generally 1963 Hearings, supra note 101, at 40, 49-50.
116 See text accompanying notes 88-91 supra.
117 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b) (4) (Supp. 1964).
118 H.R. Doc. No. 476, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1939).
119 Rev. Rul. 64-59, 1964 INT. R V. BULL. No. 8, 7 CCH 1964 STAND. FED. TAx REP.
1 6433.
120 See note 82 supra.
SECURITIES REGULATION
funds should be exempt from the Investment Company Act under the "common
trust fund" exemption. The remaining problem is whether the Securities Act of
1933, which only exempts "any security issued or guaranteed by any bank,"
121
regulates the activities of these managing agent funds. While the 1940 Act's com-
mon trust fund exemption is not to be literally found in the Securities Act, the
obvious reason is the relative inactivity of such funds in the early 1930s. No
legislative history has been found to suggest that the few such funds then existing
were even considered to involve the issuance of securities. But when the activity
of such funds became more prominent, i.e., in 1940, Congress did exempt them
from the Investment Company Act. Adequate regulation by the Federal Reserve
Board, preventing the abuses the Act was concerned with, had to be one of the
main reasons for the exemption. Since this was the basic rationale of the "bank"
exemption in the Securities Act of 1933,122 it can be assumed that, to paraphrase
what has already been said of variable annuities,123 if bank common trust funds
(even of the managing agency variety) had been flourishing in 1933, they would
in all probability have been exempted. Logic, also, seems to require the inclusion
of these common trust funds in the "bank" exemption. To have the SEC regulate
disclosure under the Securities Act and the Comptroller regulate disclosure and
other practices under Regulation 9 is completely impractical; the result paid for
by the increased burden, financial and otherwise, on the government, its tax-
payers, and the banks involved, is overlapping jurisdiction providing essentially
similar protection for the "investor." It is submitted that the Comptroller's regu-
lations can adequately provide the protection for the class of persons affected;
this qualitatively equivalent protection should also satisfy the "public offering"
exemption standard of the Ralston Purina Co. case, previously discussed.
124
Furthermore, the controlling factors in the variable annuity cases are not
present here. VALIC and Prudential involved a change in insurance concepts;
traditionally, the emphasis was on a guaranteed payment with the annuitant hav-
ing an interest in the company and adequate state regulation premised on such
a secured position; the variable annuity presented a situation in which there was
no such guarantee, no annuitant interest in the company, and antequated state
regulation unadapted to the new concept. With commingled managing agent ac-
counts, bank concepts do not involve such radical change. The Regulation F "trus-
tee" funds, always considered exempt, guaranteed nothing beyond the assumed
fiduciary responsibility and operation under strict and informed regulation by the
Federal Reserve Board. The proposed managing agent funds involve the same
elements; they are no more and no less "issued or guaranteed" by the bank than
the Regulation 9 funds. They too should be exempt from both acts.
Obviously, the most crucial basis on which to distinguish the different re-
sults advocated for variable annuities on the one hand and the commingled man-
aging agent accounts on the other is one of policy, i.e., that in the case of the bank
funds, adequate and uniform investor protection can be furnished without SEC
regulation. Bank supervisors already investigate bank-trust fund activities; Regu-
lation 9 provides these supervisors with specific provisions for managing agent
funds. If Regulation 9 is deemed inadequate - the need for a more informative
prospectus is a possibility - the Comptroller can amend it to adjust to the needs.
121 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
122 The following debate on the bank exemption is illustrative:
Mr. CANNON of Wisconsin. Why should it not cover the securities is-
sued by the bank?
Mr. RAYBURN. Because the United States Government, through its ex-
aminers and State officials, is supervising these banks, and it has been com-
plained that we are going into fields where we had no business.
77 CoNG. Rac. 2942 (1933).
123 See text accompanying note 75 supra.
124 See text accompanying notes 111-12 supra.
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On this basis, the Congress of the United States had before it several bills'2 5 which
would specifically exempt such funds from SEC jurisdiction and vest regulatory
control in the Comptroller. Although one reason for the congressional interest is
the unnecessary expense, legal uncertainty, and friction involved in the present con-
flict between two federal bodies, the bills also evince a conviction that the Comp-
troller, with statutory guidelines provided by Congress, can sufficiently provide the
investor protection deemed necessary. Legislation, not judicial decision, might
climax this controversy.
Michael D. Sullivan
125 S. 2223, H.R. 9410, H.R. 8499, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); see 109 CONG. REc.
18017-20 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1963) (includes section-by-section analysis of the proposed S.
2223), 109 CONG. REQ. 22816-17, 22850 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1963) (comment on the proposed
H.R. 9410). See generally Regulation of Bank-Operated Collective Investment Funds -
Judicial or Legislative Resolution of an Administrative Controversy? 73 YALE L.J. 1249,
1260-64 (1964) (compares pending bills with existing legislation).
